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Abstract--Global adoption of IPv6 requires the provision of a 
scalable support for multi-homed sites. This article proposes 
a multi-homing solution based on the usage of the currently 
available MIPv6 protocol. It is shown that the MIPv6 
protocol is suitable to be used for the provision of IPv6 
multi-homing support without modifications in the packet 
formats defined in the specification, and that it only requires 
minor changes in node behavior as defined in MIPv6. The 
resulting solution provides transport layer connection 
survivability while preserving routing system scalability.  
 
Index terms—IPv6, multi-homing, MIPv6, fault tolerance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As more organizations depend on critical applications 
built over the Internet, access links are becoming a vital 
resource for them. As a result, many network sites 
improve their Internet connection through multi-homing, 
i.e. the achievement of global connectivity through 
several connections, possibly supplied by different 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). However, the extended 
usage of the currently available IPv4 multi-homing 
solution is jeopardizing the future of the Internet, since it 
has become a major contributor to the post-CIDR 
exponential growth in the number of global routing table 
entries [1].  
Taking this into account, a cornerstone of the design of 
IPv6 was routing system scalability, which initially 
resulted in the prohibition of massive route injection into 
core routers. As a result of this policy, direct adoption of 
IPv4 multi-homing techniques into IPv6 world was 
inhibited, so new mechanisms were needed. However, 
currently available IPv6 multi-homing solutions fail to 
provide IPv4 multi-homing equivalent benefits, imposing 
an additional penalty for those adopting the new protocol. 
This handicap prevents IPv6 adoption in critical 
environments, and it also provides an excellent excuse to 
reluctant users. Despite its relevance, developing a 
scalable multi-homing solution has proven to be a 
problem extremely hard to solve. 
In a different area, during the last few years the Internet 
community has invested an important amount of effort in 
providing support for mobile users in IPv6. The result is 
the almost completed specification of Mobile IPv6 
[2](hereafter MIPv6), which preserves established 
communication with moving devices. 
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It is relevant to note that the common goal of the multi-
homing and mobility solutions is to provide a 
communicating node with uninterrupted connectivity 
throughout changes in the point that it is using for 
attaching to the public IP network. In the mobility 
scenario, the communicating end-point changes its 
attachment point because of its movement. In the multi-
homing scenario, the attachment point used by the end-
point for communication varies because of topological 
changes caused by outages in the communication 
elements. While the causes are different, there seems to 
be enough similarities between the two scenarios to 
consider common solutions.  
Considering that the basic specification for MIPv6 is 
almost finished, and that the appropriate approach for 
IPv6 multi-homing support is far from reaching 
consensus, this paper analyzes the application of the 
mobility solution to the multi-homing problem.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in 
section 2 the IPv6 multi-homing problem is characterized. 
In section 3, the application scenario is presented. Next, 
in section 4, the MIPv6-based multi-homing solution is 
described. Details of the resulting behavior of the solution 
follow on section 5, and section 6 includes related work. 
Finally, section 7 is devoted to conclusions and future 
work. 
II. THE MULTI-HOMING PROBLEM  
 
Back in early 90's, the Classless Inter-Domain Routing 
(CIDR) address allocation strategy [3] was created in 
order to cope with the BGP routing table size explosion 
problem. CIDR proposes the allocation of IP address 
blocks to transit providers so that customers obtain its 
address allocation directly from their service provider, 
instead of obtaining it from a central allocation authority. 
This strategy allows providers to announce one single 
aggregated route that describes all their customers, 
reducing the number of routes in the global BGP routing 
table. Addresses allocated following the above-described 
policy are called Provider Aggregatable (PA) (see 
Acronyms Appendix). CIDR provides maximum 
aggregation efficiency when the network graph is a tree, 
with providers at the nodes of the tree and end-sites at the 
leafs. However, the actual network topology does present 
a fair amount of exceptions to the ideal tree topology, 
because it is tending to become a dense connectivity mesh 
[1]. Among the several exceptions to the tree topology 
that can be found in the current Internet, multi-homed 
sites are a case that has a direct impact in the routing table 
size, since multiple available routes to the multi-homed 
sites must be announced globally in order to obtain multi-
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homing benefits. This implies that the size of the BGP 
routing table will be increased as the number of multi-
homers plus the number of providers, which seemed to be 
somehow acceptable until the number of multi-homed 
sites started to grow exponentially in 1999 [1].  
In IPv6, without the limitations imposed by IPv4 address 
scarcity, it is possible to guarantee provider aggregation 
efficiency by assigning multiple prefixes to a multi-
homed site, each one corresponding to a different 
provider [4]. In this configuration, providers serving 
multi-homed sites only announce their aggregate in the 
BGP routing table, and multi-homed sites obtain as many 
prefixes as providers they have, implying that a multi-
homed site is represented in the address space as multiple 
single-homed sites. In order to benefit from multi-homing, 
nodes within the multi-homed site must configure 
multiple addresses (one per provider) in each interface. 
This configuration allows these interfaces to be reachable 
through the multiple providers. However, this 
arrangement does not provide by itself survivability for 
the established connections throughout an outage in the 
provider that was being used when the communication 
was initiated, as it will be described in detail in the next 
section. So, additional mechanisms are needed in order to 
provide an IPv6 multi-homing solution compatible with 
PA addressing that could fulfill current IPv4 fault 
tolerance level. 








Figure 1: Scenario Topology 
 
The application scenario consists of a multi-homed end-
site that obtains global connectivity through two (or 
more) ISPs i.e. ISPA and ISPB.  Since the end-site is 
multi-homed and provider aggregatable addresses are 
being used, the site has obtained two address ranges: one 
delegated from ISPA address range (i.e. PrefA:Site::/48) 
and the other one from ISPB address space (i.e.  
PrefB:Site::/48). Furthermore, in order to benefit from 
multi-homing, hosts within the site have to be reachable 
through both ISPs. This implies that hosts have to 
configure one address from each ISP address range that 
the site has obtained. However, this configuration does 
not allow the preservation of established connections 
through an outage. This is the result of: 
•  Most connections established at the transport 
level and above identify the nodes involved in 
the communication by their IP addresses, 
imposing that they must remain unchanged 
during the lifetime of the connection. 
•  In order to preserve aggregation benefits, PA 
addresses delegated to the end-site by an ISP are 
to be routed through this ISP.  
These constraints imply that if a connection between 
Host1 and Host2 is established using PrefA:Site:Host2 as 
the address for Host2, packets flowing to Host2 will be 
routed through ISPA, and only through ISPA. Then, if 
during the lifetime of this connection an outage occurs in 
ISPA, the connection will be dropped, even if a path 
between Host1 and Host2 is available.  
 
IV. A MIPV6-BASED MULTI-HOMING SOLUTION  
A. Required capabilities 
 
In order to preserve established connections throughout 
an outage, the following capabilities are required: 
1. A protocol to inform the other end of the 
communication about the alternative path that is 
to be used. Since PA addresses are used, 
alternative paths (alternative ISPs) are 
represented by alternative destination addresses. 
So the protocol is used for conveying alternative 
destination address. 
2. A mechanism that allows packets carrying the 
alternative address as destination address to be 
recognized as belonging to the established 
connection, which means that the original 
destination address has to be restored when the 
final destination is reached. 
3. A path failure detection mechanism, that enables 
end-hosts to detect outages in the path that is 
currently being used.  
4. Tools to ensure compatibility with ingress 
filtering mechanisms. Since an alternative ISP 
will be used when an outage occurs, packets 
carrying the original source address would be 
incompatible with ingress filtering mechanisms. 
B. Solution Rationale 
 
In this section, we will propose a multi-homing solution 
that profits from MIPv6 message exchanges for 
preserving established connections. We will see that the 
MIPv6 protocol provides the signaling needed to convey 
alternative path information. However, we will also 
present that some modification in the behavior of the 
nodes is needed. It should be noted that most of the 
required modifications are imposed to nodes within the 
multi-homed site, while only minor modifications are 
required to external nodes. 
In order to apply the MIPv6 protocol to the considered 
scenario, the first step is to map the multi-homing 
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host (MHH) has the need to use multiple alternative 
addresses in a given connection, it will assume the role of 
Mobile Node (MN), while the node that it is 
communicating with it will have the role of 
Correspondent Node (CN). It is assumed that CNs support 
route optimization. Home Agent capabilities are not 
required. 
 
1) Required capability 1: Protocol for conveying 
alternative path information. 
 
The most natural application of the MIPv6 protocol for 
this problem is the usage of Binding Update (BU) 
messages to inform the CN that an alternative address is 
to be used for the established communication, fulfilling 
requirement 1. So, when the MHH detects that the 
currently used path becomes unavailable, it would send a 
BU message to the CN, informing that an alternative 
address is to be used. In MIPv6 terminology, the original 
address would be the Home Address (HoA) and the new 
alternative address would be the Care-of Address (CoA) 
(Figure 2). However, MIPv6 security requirements 
impose the performance of the Return Routability (RR) 
procedure to enable the required BU message 
authorization. Such procedure, illustrated in figure 2, 
implies the exchange of Home Test Init (HoTI) and Home 
Test (HoT) messages using the HoA, and the exchange of 
Care-of Test Init (CoTI) and Care-of Test (CoT) messages 
using the CoA. These exchanges are designed to verify 
that the host reachable through both the CoA and the HoA 
is the same. This means that the MHH needs to be 
reachable through both paths, implying that these 
exchanges cannot be performed successfully once an 
outage has occurred. So, the RR procedure should be 
performed when a connection with a new CN is 
established allowing the protection of this connection 
during its lifetime. 
However, the data used for the generation of 
authorization information has a limited lifetime, imposing 
periodical RR checks, in order to ensure that valid BU 
authorization information is available when an outage 
occurs. Time constraints imposed by the MIPv6 
specification are that authorization data must remain valid 
for at least MAX_TOKEN_LIFE (210 sec.) after it has 
been used for the RR procedure, but no longer than 
MAX_NONCE_LIFE (240 sec). 
These constraints impose the performance of the RR 
procedure every MAX_TOKEN_LIFE minus the time 
required to perform the procedure, which would include 
the Round Trip Time (RTT) and the processing time. If 
the typical value used for TCP connection establishment 
timeout (75 sec) is accepted as a reasonable upper bound 
to the RTT, the RR procedure needs to be performed 
every 135 sec. 
 
2) Required capability 2: Original connection 
packets recognition capability. 
 
Once that the availability of the information needed to 
authorize BU messages is guaranteed, the MHH is 
prepared to re-route its connections through an alternative 
address when an outage occurs. So, when the outage is 
detected, the MHH will send a BU message to the CN, 
informing that a new address (CoA) is to be used. Then, 
the CN will address packets to the new CoA as long as the 
Binding Cache Entry (BCE) that links the HoA with the 
particular CoA remains valid (discussed below). 
However, packets addressed to CoA have to be 
recognized as belonging to the established connection. 
This can be achieved by using the Type 2 Routing Header 
specified in MIPv6, in the same way that it is used for 
supporting mobility. That is, after receiving a valid BU, 
the CN addresses packets to the MHH to the new CoA, 
and it also includes a Type 2 Routing Header carrying the 
HoA. The resulting behavior is that when these packets 
reach the MHH through the CoA, the Routing Header is 
processed and the HoA is restored and packets are 
presented to the transport and above layers as being 
addressed to the HoA, preserving established connections. 
As we stated above, communication can be preserved as 
long as the correspondent BCE in the CN remains valid. It 
is stated in MIPv6 specification that BCEs that have been 
authorized using the RR procedure have a maximum 
lifetime of MAX_RR_BINDING_LIFE (420 sec). If this 
CoA is to be used to reach the HoA after this period, a 
new BU message binding the HoA and the CoA has to be 
sent. However, as it has been presented earlier, the BU 
authorization data has to be acquired using the RR 
procedure, which implies communication through both 
the CoA and the HoA. In the multi-homing scenario, the 
RR procedure cannot be performed once that an outage 
occurred along the initial path, since the HoA is 
unreachable. This constraint means that if the MIPv6 
protocol is used for preserving an established 
communication in multi-homed environments, such 
communication can only be preserved for 7 minutes after 
an outage occurs which seems to be a severe limitation 
for this application. It is then deemed necessary to 
overcome this limitation if MIPv6 is to be applied to 
solve the multi-homing problem. However, the BCE 
lifetime has been limited to a few minutes in order to limit 
the possibility of time shifting attacks, as it is presented in 
[5]. The goal of MIPv6 security is to avoid the 
introduction of new security hazards that are not present 
in non-MIPv6 enabled environments. In particular, the 
goal of the RR procedure is the reduction of the set of 
potential attackers to those who can intercept packets 
flowing between the MN and the CN. This procedure 
forces the attacker to be present somewhere along the 
path between the mobile node and the correspondent node 
in order to acquire valid authorization data needed to 
generate forged BU messages. 
However, this mechanism by itself only imposes that the 
attacker has to be present on the path the time needed to 
intercept the messages that carry authorization 
information. Once that the attacker has intercepted valid 
authorization information, he can leave his position along 
the path and still perform attacks using such information. 
These are called time shifting attacks since an attacker 
that once was on-path intercepting packets can perform 
attacks in the future, when he is no longer on the 
communication path. Time shifting attacks can be 
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achieved in the following way: the attacker placed along 
the communication path intercepts authorization 
information and generates a forged BU message. The 
attacker leaves the position, but the attack continues since 
the traffic is still diverted to the CoA contained in the fake 
BU message. The effect of this attack is limited by 
reducing BCE lifetime in the CN to 7 minutes, imposing 
the generation of a new BU message in order to restore 
the BCE.  
In order to enable a MIPv6 based multi-homing solution, 
BCE lifetime has to susceptible to be extended but 
alternative protection must be provided. So, the following 
modification in the CN behavior is proposed. The CN 
must send a Binding Refresh Request (BRR) to the HoA 
included in the BCE, if the BCE has not been refreshed by 
the mobile node for 420 sec. In case that this is a 
legitimate BCE, the mobile node will send a BU to refresh 
it. If this is a fake BCE, the fixed node will reply to the 
BRR message with an ICMP Parameter Problem [6]. 
Then, upon the reception of an ICMP Parameter Problem 
message, the CN has to delete the correspondent fake 
BCE from the cache, terminating the attack. However, if 
this address has became unavailable because of an outage, 
an ICMP Destination Unreachable message containing a 
No Route to Destination code is to be sent. In this case, it 
is proposed that when the CN node receives such a 
message, it must verify that it is the reply to the BRR 
message by contrasting it with the information contained 
within the ICMP message payload. If the verification is 
successful, the CN recognizes the multi-homing 
application of the protocol and extends the lifetime of the 
BCE for another 420 sec. The proposed modification 
achieves the initial goal that was to avoid attacks coming 
from a host that is not present along the used path. 
 
3) Required capability 3: Path failure detection 
mechanism 
 
Additionally, a failure detection mechanism that triggers 
the generation of BU messages is required to provide a 
complete solution. A path failure detection mechanism 
can be based on the exchange of HoTI/HoT messages. 
The RR procedure needs to be performed periodically, 
implying message exchange between the MHH and the 
CN. However, in order to provide a failure detection 
mechanism, the message exchange frequency has to be 
increased, not only because its period of 135 seconds may 
be deemed as unacceptable for certain applications, but 
because valid authorization information is required for 
sending the BU message. Since a failure is indicated by at 
least one keep-alive message lost, it is necessary that after 
such event valid BU authorization information is still 
available, which imply that the information acquired 
during the previous message exchange is still valid. Then, 
assuming that a failure is indicated by the lost of two 
consecutive keep-alive packets, HoTI messages have to 
be generated by the MHH every MAX_TOKEN_LIFE/3 
seconds, i.e. 70 seconds. Then if two HoTI messages are 
lost, that is, if no reply is received 140 sec. after a HoTI 
was sent, a BU message is generated and an alternative 
route is used. The simple mechanism presented provides 
the minimum required functionality while honoring the 
timing constraints imposed by the RR procedure 
parameters. Failure response time can be improved by 
increasing the message exchange frequency. Moreover, 
adaptive mechanism, such as the TCP time-out 
calculation mechanism can also be considered, as long as 
they respect the timing constraints imposed by MIPv6 
 
4) Required capability 4: Tools to ensure 
compatibility with ingress filtering mechanisms. 
 
When a MHH has multiple PA addresses configured in its 
interface, source address selection implies the selection of 
the ISP to be used in the return path. Moreover, because 
of ISP ingress filtering mechanism, source address 
selection also imposes the ISP to be used in the forward 
path, requiring additional functionalities at the multi-
homed site to guarantee the appropriate ISP selection as 
discussed in [7]. Besides, when host based path failure 
detection mechanisms are used, the only party that has the 
information needed for selecting the path to be used is the 
host itself. So, in order to guarantee the compatibility with 
ingress filtering mechanisms, the MHH can select the exit 
ISP by means of a Routing Header. In order to simplify 
ISP selection, the Site Exit Anycast Address (SEAA) 
defined in [7] can be used. Then, after performing source 
address selection, the MHH addresses packets to the 
SEAA corresponding to the ISP that has assigned the 
address used as source address and it includes the final 
destination address in a Routing Header.  
Additional complexity results when an outage occurs. In 
this case, an alternative ISP is to be used for coursing 
packets. Source address filtering mechanisms of the 
alternative ISP precludes the flow of packets carrying the 
address originally used, i.e. the HoA. However, the CN 
only recognizes packets as belonging to the established 
connection if they carry the original HoA. In order to 
overcome this issue, the Home Address Destination 
Option is to be used, so that the source address 
corresponding to the alternative ISP (i.e. the CoA) is 
carried in the Source Address field of the IPv6 header and 
the original address (i.e. the HoA) is carried within the 
Home Address Option. When the packet is received by 
the CN, it processes the Home Address Option and 
restores the HoA as the Source Address. 
 
 
V. RESULTING BEHAVIOR  
 
In this section, the complete operation of the solution is 
described. 
The communication established between the MHH and 
the CN can be initiated by any of the parties. Suppose that 
the communication is initiated by the CN (the case where 
the communication is initiated by the MHH is analogous): 
It will first obtain at least one of the MHH's addresses, for 
instance using the DNS. If all the MHH's addresses are 
listed in the DNS, the CN will pick one and try to initiate 
the communication using this address. If a failure has  


















Figure 2: Solution Behavior 
 
 
occurred along the path, the attempt to initiate the 
communication will fail, and the CN will try another 
address. Eventually, a packet from the CN will reach the 
MHH. The CN will then reply to the received packet 
using the addresses contained within the packet. The 
MHH attempts to communicate with the CN using the 
selected source address. In order to avoid that the 
discarding of the packet by the ISP ingress filtering 
mechanism, the MHH addresses the packet to the SEAA 
of the ISP that assigned the source address selected and 
includes the CN address within a Routing Header.  
Once that the MHH starts sending packets to the CN, 
different address roles have been set: the address used as 
Source Address in the first packet flowing from MHH to 
CN will be the HoA, and the other available addresses of 
MHH will be CoAs. It should be noted that these roles are 
assigned when the communication is established, and they 
are not predetermined. In the application scenario, we 
suppose that the first packet flowing from MHH to CN 
has PrefA:Site:Host2 as source address, so that: 
PrefA:Site:Host2 is the HoA and PrefB:Site:Host2 is the 
CoA. 
Once the first packet is carried from MHH to CN, the 
MHH has to perform the RR procedure in order to obtain 
valid authorization data. The RR procedure consists on 
exchanging HoTI/HoT messages using the HoA, and 
CoTI/CoT messages using CoA. These messages also 
have to include a Routing Header to select the appropriate 
exit ISP. The HoTI/HoT message exchange is also used as 
a path failure detection mechanism, imposing a HoTI/HoT 
exchange every 70 sec.  
If no outage occurs, the communication continues as it is, 
and HoTI/HoT and CoTI/CoT message exchanges 
continue until the communication is finished. 
If an outage occurs, it will be detected by the failure 
detection mechanism and an alternative path will be used. 
If two consecutive packets HoTI are not replied within 
140 sec. after the first message was sent, a failure will be 
assumed. If this is the case, a BU message is sent, 
informing the CN that the CoA will be used to exchange 
packets. This BU message will carry the authorization 
information obtained through the last successful 
HoTI/HoT and CoTI/CoT message exchanges.  
Then, an alternative ISP will be used to course packets 
between the MHH and the CN. Packets from the CN to 
the MHH will contain a Type 2 Routing Header in order 
to be routed through the alternative ISP. Packets from the 
MHH to the CN will carry the Home Address Destination 
Option and a Routing Header to select the exit ISP: 
The communication can continue using this route while 
the binding established at the CN remains valid. The CN 
sends periodical BRR messages, and if an ICMP 
Destination Unreachable message containing a No Route 
to Destination code is replied, it extends the BCE lifetime. 
 
VI. RELATED WORK 
 
In this section, we will consider alternative approaches 
proposed to tackle the IPv6 multi-homing problem. An 
approach compatible with PA addressing is presented in 
[8]. If we apply this mechanism to the multi-homed site 
depicted in Figure 1, the solution consists in building a 
tunnel between an ISPA exit router and RB, and another 
tunnel between ISPB exit router and RA. Then if a link is 
down, packets are forwarded through the tunnel. In this 
case, alternative route information is confined to routers 
connecting ISPs with multi-homed sites, so the scalability 
of the global routing system is preserved. However, this 
solution presents limited fault tolerance capabilities. 
The Host Centric Multi-homing proposal that is being 
developed in [7] provides some of the multi-homing 
benefits through available tools such as Router 
Advertisements and Router Renumbering. It also deals 
with the problem caused by ingress filtering. This 
problem is basically caused when packets containing a 
source address from the ISPA block are coursed from the 
multi-homed site through ISPB (figure 1). In this case, 
ingress filtering configured in the ISPB ingress router will 
discard those packets, because their source address is 
considered to be spoofed. Host Centric Multi-homing 
solution proposes several options to deal with this issue, 
ranging from source address routing to redirecting 
packets to appropriate site exit routers. However, this 
proposal does not include mechanisms to preserve 
established communications through an outage in the used 
route. So, the authors consider that both proposals 
complement each other, since they address different 
aspects of the multi-homing problem. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
 
In this paper we have presented a multi-homing solution 
for IPv6 sites based on the usage of MIPv6 protocol. The 
main benefit of the solution is its compatibility with the 
existent technology. Changes needed involve mainly hosts 
within the multi-homed site, which must perform a failure 
detection mechanism exchanging MIPv6 messages. The 
solution only implies a minor change in external nodes, 
which must be modified so that they extend BCE lifetime 
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upon the reception of an ICMP Destination Unreachable 
message containing a No Route to Destination Code as a 
reply of a BRR message. Besides, it should be noted that 
the solution is compatible with the PA scheme, granting 
the scalability of the routing system. 
Multiple additional optimizations can be done to enhance 
the solution. Some of which are presented next. MIPv6 
specification includes the possibility of piggybacking 
binding related messages in data packets as a future 
extension of the protocol to reduce the overhead. 
Other possible optimization that can be performed is 
related to the failure detection mechanism. The proposed 
mechanism provides minimum facilities. Improved 
algorithms can be proposed so that faster detection is 
provided. For instance adaptive mechanisms such as the 
ones used by TCP can be adopted.  
 
APPENDIX: ACRONYMS 
BA: Binding Acknowledgment 
BCE: Binding Cache Entry 
BRR: Binding Refresh Request 
BU: Binding Update 
CN: Correspondent Node 
CoA: Care-of Address 
CoT: Care-of Test 
CoTI: Care-of Test Init 
HoA: Home Address 
HoT: Home Test 
HoTI: Home Test Init 
MHH: Multi-Homed Host 
MN: Mobile Node 
PA: Provider Aggregatable 
RR: Return Routability 
SEAA: Site Exit Anycast Address 
SEAAA: Site Exit Anycast Address corresponding to 
ISPA 
SEAAB: Site Exit Anycast Address corresponding to 
ISPB 
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